Difference between revisions of "SystemsSec 2018W Lecture 7"
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==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
- You want cryptography whenever your rival can mess with bits. | |||
i.e see, modify, etc. | |||
- If you're talking about an isolated device, i.e single terminal for one person. | |||
what does crypto do for you? almost nothing. (ex: what if someone steals the system? if they mess with hardware?) | |||
- TLS, SSH most common protocols nowadays for detection. | |||
- #1 Rule: Never do your own crypto, including implementation. | |||
- Most common use case on an individual system: file/file-systems encryption | |||
- You can encrypt a file and send it, but if you have to send it, someone has to do something on the reciever side to decrypt it. | |||
Trusted Software (DRM): DRM: Digital Rights Management | |||
- Almsot no scope for confidentiality, meant mostly for preventing messing with bits. | |||
- Trusted Boot: | |||
- TPM: Trusted Platform Model, this is the portion of a chip that is meant to hold secrets and can do computations without giving away info. | |||
As long as TPM is safe, all data is safe. | |||
- An attacker must do 1 of 3 things if they want data access: break TPM, break the crypto, or get the keys. | |||
- Arguably, getting the keys might be the easiest, even for a company like Apple or Microsoft (Trick one of the human(s) with the keys). | |||
- MalwareBytes: 2 bad updates, essentially acting as a dedicated denial of service. This is a breach of trust. | |||
- How did MS sign my boot order even though I have linux? Because they're allowed to. | |||
- The reason you can't have linux on an Apple device is because of trusted boot; | |||
to startup linux, you would have to break the boot order, which would trigger security precautions. | |||
But, get the keys, and you could probably do it. | |||
Revision as of 01:52, 31 January 2018
Audio
Notes
- You want cryptography whenever your rival can mess with bits. i.e see, modify, etc. - If you're talking about an isolated device, i.e single terminal for one person. what does crypto do for you? almost nothing. (ex: what if someone steals the system? if they mess with hardware?)
- TLS, SSH most common protocols nowadays for detection. - #1 Rule: Never do your own crypto, including implementation. - Most common use case on an individual system: file/file-systems encryption - You can encrypt a file and send it, but if you have to send it, someone has to do something on the reciever side to decrypt it.
Trusted Software (DRM): DRM: Digital Rights Management
- Almsot no scope for confidentiality, meant mostly for preventing messing with bits. - Trusted Boot: - TPM: Trusted Platform Model, this is the portion of a chip that is meant to hold secrets and can do computations without giving away info. As long as TPM is safe, all data is safe. - An attacker must do 1 of 3 things if they want data access: break TPM, break the crypto, or get the keys. - Arguably, getting the keys might be the easiest, even for a company like Apple or Microsoft (Trick one of the human(s) with the keys). - MalwareBytes: 2 bad updates, essentially acting as a dedicated denial of service. This is a breach of trust.
- How did MS sign my boot order even though I have linux? Because they're allowed to. - The reason you can't have linux on an Apple device is because of trusted boot; to startup linux, you would have to break the boot order, which would trigger security precautions. But, get the keys, and you could probably do it.