COMP 3000 Essay 2 2010 Question 2

Paper

Trust and Protection in the Illinois Browser Operating System

http://www.usenix.org/events/osdi10/tech/full_papers/Tang.pdf

Shuo Tang, Haohui Mai, Samuel T. King

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaig

Presentation slides to go along with the paper: Trust and Protection in the Illinois Browser Operating System. http://www.cs.uiuc.edu/homes/stang6/ibos.html#slide1

Research Problem

Modern browsers, such as Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox, are constantly being revised and updated to keep up with the latest attacks, but continuously have hundreds of security vulnerabilities. Most of these attacks are simple, slightly harmful assaults on web applications, but many attacks are on the browser or even the operating system/libraries. A successful attack on a browser can have horrible repercussion because these occur lower on the shared storage stack than the attacks on the applications because it gives access to all the browser data for all the web application and also provides the attacker with the access to other system resources on the system which is being exploited. An attack on the operating system can be disastrous if it is successful and may cause serious damage to the entire system this is due to the fact that the attackers can access arbitrary states and events, allowing them to have full control over the system. The focus of this research is to prevent or/and to decrease the attacks on browser, libraries, operating systems and system services.

Background Concepts

The Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS) is not just a new browser to improve security, it is also a full operating system. It’s main goal is to expose browser-level abstractions at the lowest possible software layer, reducing the trusted computing base for web browsers. Many websites and web applications have become major targets for attackers and hackers. Just recently, cross-site scripting (XSS) has become the most common security vulnerability over the age old buffer overflow.

Plenty of research has gone in to improving security among the various web browsers on the market today but all browsers still remain susceptible to attacks on the lower layers. Compromised Ethernet drivers can send sensitive HTTP packets to third parties, compromised storage modules can send persistent data to unwanted viewers and compromised window managers can overlay fake interfaces common in phishing attacks. Common web browsers run on top of commodity operating systems with shared system services and user-mode libraries, increasing the trusted code base. IBOS looks to solve this issue by exposing browser-level abstractions rather than just general-purpose abstractions. Important concepts such as cookies, HTTP connections and tabs for displaying pages are all brought into the browser abstraction layer. By using all of these methods, the IBOS system ultimately aims to reduce the computers Trusted Computing Base(TCB).

TCB

The TCB is the hardware and software that is critical to the computer's security. Modern operating system/browser combinations have massive TCBs that may have several millions of lines of code. By extracting components such as device drivers from the kernel, one can lower a systems TCB considerably. If a device driver is outside of the TCB and becomes corrupted, the effects would not be too severe, but if the driver is left in the TCB, then the results could be cataclysmic. By removing elements from the TCB, the risk of having an attack get inside is greatly reduced.

Contribution

IBOS has considerably smaller trusted code base compared to other modern browsers. Where both Chrome and Firefox come in at over 4 million plus lines of code in their trusted code base, IBOS has only about 42,000. Since IBOS is separated into lower level components, it was also able to prevent between 75-100% of vulnerabilities from affected components on a machine. Using Chrome, the researchers tested 175 known issues on the IBOS kernel which ranged from memory exploits to interface spoofing. Out of all the known issues, IBOS was able to prevent 135 or 77% of the issues whereas Chrome was only able to contain 83 of them. The issue is that Chrome is able to catch exploits in its rendering engine since it is in a sandbox but any exploits that took advantage of the browser kernel could not be prevented. This is not a problem for IBOS because many of the browser components inside the trusted code base in Chrome have been brought outside of the IBOS trusted code base limiting what can be done with exploitation.

In terms of performance, IBOS is comparable to the two best performing web browsers out current: Firefox and Chrome. For websites such as Google Maps and Facebook, IBOS actually performs much better than Firefox while loading pages. For other sites like Wikipedia, Craigslist and Bing, IBOS performs on a level between Chrome and Firefox so essentially there will be a negligible change in the user's browsing experience based on the websites they view using IBOS.

Critique

This paper was very well organized and executed. It naturally flows and keeps order in what it is trying to explain without the need to flip back and reference another piece of content in the paper. Starting with the core mechanics of why it is needed to how the kernel is organized and working its way up to many high-level pieces of information it felt like a natural progression of ideas, giving you the information you need to understand upcoming concepts.

References

You will almost certainly have to refer to other resources; please cite these resources in the style of citation of the papers assigned (inlined numbered references). Place your bibliographic entries in this section.