CCS2011: Enemy of the Good
ToDo
- Gather data from different IDS observables to show they aren't Gaussian
- system calls (Luc)
 - network traffic
 - log files
 
 - Machine learning
- standard machine learning methods approximate distributions
 - approximation works best if Gaussian but has limits (show mathematically)
 - non-Gaussian distributions place much harsher restrictions on error rates, they don't go down proportionally to sample size? (more math)
 
 - Survey of results in IDS literature
 
Title
The Enemy of the Good: Re-evaluating Research Directions in Intrusion Detection
Abstract
Introduction
What Goes Wrong
- Poor results
- datasets do not represent real-world usage or scenarios accurately
 - insufficient or misleading tests of false positive rates
 - Even when rates are accurate, they are misinterpreted: high FP rates are not considered to be high (wrong time scale, lack of attention to scalability)
 - misleading integration of attacks into legitimate behavior
 
 - Administrative overhead
- rules that can only be created by experts, but system requires end users to create custom rules
 - experts required to interpret output
 - insufficient context for even experts to interpret output
 - assumption of existence of security personnel that won't even exist in many important contexts
 
 - Computational overhead
- can system keep up with normal workloads?
 - can system keep up with attacker-generated workloads?
 
 - Anomalies versus attacks
- why is one a good proxy for the other?
 - why is chosen feature(s) particularly good at detecting attacks?
 
 - Out of the box algorithms applied w/o understanding security problem
 - Attacker evasion: how can attacker manipulate system? Can system lead to environment that is easier to attack?