SystemsSec 2018W Lecture 7: Difference between revisions
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==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
- You want cryptography whenever your rival can mess with bits. | - You want cryptography whenever your rival can mess with bits. i.e see, modify, etc. | ||
- If you're talking about an isolated device, i.e single terminal for one person. | - If you're talking about an isolated device, i.e single terminal for one person. | ||
what does crypto do for you? almost nothing. (ex: what if someone steals the system? if they mess with hardware?) | what does crypto do for you? almost nothing. (ex: what if someone steals the system? if they mess with hardware?) | ||
- TLS, SSH most common protocols nowadays for detection. | - TLS, SSH most common protocols nowadays for detection. | ||
- #1 Rule: Never do your own crypto, including implementation. | - #1 Rule: Never do your own crypto, including implementation. | ||
- Most common use case on an individual system: file/file-systems encryption | - Most common use case on an individual system: file/file-systems encryption | ||
- You can encrypt a file and send it, but if you have to send it, someone has to do something on the reciever side to decrypt it. | - You can encrypt a file and send it, but if you have to send it, someone has to do something on the reciever side to decrypt it. | ||
Trusted Software (DRM): DRM: Digital Rights Management | **Trusted Software (DRM): DRM: Digital Rights Management** | ||
- Almsot no scope for confidentiality, meant mostly for preventing messing with bits. | - Almsot no scope for confidentiality, meant mostly for preventing messing with bits. | ||
- Trusted Boot: | - Trusted Boot: | ||
- TPM: Trusted Platform Model, this is the portion of a chip that is meant to hold secrets and can do computations without giving away info. | - TPM: Trusted Platform Model, this is the portion of a chip that is meant to hold secrets and can do computations without giving away info. | ||
As long as TPM is safe, all data is safe. | As long as TPM is safe, all data is safe. | ||
- An attacker must do 1 of 3 things if they want data access: break TPM, break the crypto, or get the keys. | - An attacker must do 1 of 3 things if they want data access: break TPM, break the crypto, or get the keys. | ||
- Arguably, getting the keys might be the easiest, even for a company like Apple or Microsoft (Trick one of the human(s) with the keys). | - Arguably, getting the keys might be the easiest, even for a company like Apple or Microsoft (Trick one of the human(s) with the keys). | ||
- MalwareBytes: 2 bad updates, essentially acting as a dedicated denial of service. This is a breach of trust. | - MalwareBytes: 2 bad updates, essentially acting as a dedicated denial of service. This is a breach of trust. | ||
- How did MS sign my boot order even though I have linux? Because they're allowed to. | - How did MS sign my boot order even though I have linux? Because they're allowed to. | ||
- The reason you can't have linux on an Apple device is because of trusted boot; | |||
- The reason you can't have linux on an Apple device is because of trusted boot; to startup linux, you would have to break the boot order, which would trigger security precautions. But, get the keys, and you could probably do it. | |||
Revision as of 05:54, 31 January 2018
Audio
Notes
- You want cryptography whenever your rival can mess with bits. i.e see, modify, etc.
- If you're talking about an isolated device, i.e single terminal for one person.
what does crypto do for you? almost nothing. (ex: what if someone steals the system? if they mess with hardware?)
- TLS, SSH most common protocols nowadays for detection.
- #1 Rule: Never do your own crypto, including implementation.
- Most common use case on an individual system: file/file-systems encryption
- You can encrypt a file and send it, but if you have to send it, someone has to do something on the reciever side to decrypt it.
- Trusted Software (DRM): DRM: Digital Rights Management**
- Almsot no scope for confidentiality, meant mostly for preventing messing with bits.
- Trusted Boot:
- TPM: Trusted Platform Model, this is the portion of a chip that is meant to hold secrets and can do computations without giving away info.
As long as TPM is safe, all data is safe.
- An attacker must do 1 of 3 things if they want data access: break TPM, break the crypto, or get the keys.
- Arguably, getting the keys might be the easiest, even for a company like Apple or Microsoft (Trick one of the human(s) with the keys).
- MalwareBytes: 2 bad updates, essentially acting as a dedicated denial of service. This is a breach of trust.
- How did MS sign my boot order even though I have linux? Because they're allowed to.
- The reason you can't have linux on an Apple device is because of trusted boot; to startup linux, you would have to break the boot order, which would trigger security precautions. But, get the keys, and you could probably do it.