COMP5900 COMP4900 2024F: Reading list: Difference between revisions

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Introduction to the course and trusted computing
Trust
- Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers
- Reflections on Trusting Trust (Turing Award lecture, 1984)
- SafeKeeper: Protecting Web Passwords using Trusted Execution Environments
Application of TC technologies
- SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX (*)
- SGX-Tor: A Secure and Practical Tor Anonymity Network with SGX Enclaves (*)
- EnclaveDB: A Secure Database using SGX (*)
- SGX-Log: Securing System Logs with SGX (*)
- OS integrity: Nighthawk: Transparent System Introspection from Ring -3 (*)
- Hypervisor integrity: HyperCheck: A Hardware-Assisted Integrity Monitor (*)
- Data protection: Pesos: Policy Enhanced Secure Object Store (*)
Making TC technologies more adoptable/usable
- Flicker: An Execution Infrastructure for TCB Minimization (*)
- Glamdring: Automatic Application Partitioning for Intel SGX (*)
- Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX (*)
- Civet: An Efficient Java Partitioning Framework for Hardware Enclaves (*)
- vTZ: Virtualizing ARM TrustZone (*)
- Towards Memory Safe Enclave Programming with Rust-SGX [Rust + SGX] (*)
- RusTEE: Developing Memory-Safe ARM TrustZone Applications [Rust + ARM] (*)
- SGXPy: Protecting integrity of Python applications with Intel SGX [Python + SGX] (*)
- Using ARM TrustZone to Build a Trusted Language Runtime for Mobile Applications [.NET + SGX] (*)
Side-channel attacks
Internal misbehavior: memory attacks
- SoK: Eternal War in Memory (*)
- Memory Errors: The Past, the Present, and the Future
- Defense: C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (*)
- Defense: PTAuth: Temporal Memory Safety via Robust Points-to Authentication (*)
- Attacking the defense: PACMAN: Attacking ARM Pointer Authentication with Speculative Execution (*)
Human authenticating machine
State continuity
Secure input/output
Proposed hardware improvements
- Fine-grained isolation: IMIX: In-Process Memory Isolation EXtension (*)
- Memory safety: HAFIX: Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity Extension (*)
- Integrity monitoring: Co-processor-based Behavior Monitoring: Application to the Detection of Attacks Against the System Management Mode (*)
- Integrity monitoring: CPU Transparent Protection of OS Kernel and Hypervisor Integrity with Programmable DRAM (*)
Proposals based on existing (non-security) hardware support

@@ Line 24: / Line 24: @@
 **	[https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-hua.pdf vTZ: Virtualizing ARM TrustZone] (*)
 **	[https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3319535.3354241 Towards Memory Safe Enclave Programming with Rust-SGX] [Rust + SGX] (*)
-**	RusTEE: Developing Memory-Safe ARM TrustZone Applications [Rust + ARM] (*)
+**	[https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3427228.3427262 RusTEE: Developing Memory-Safe ARM TrustZone Applications] [Rust + ARM] (*)
-**	SGXPy: Protecting integrity of Python applications with Intel SGX [Python + SGX] (*)
+**	[https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8945648 SGXPy: Protecting integrity of Python applications with Intel SGX] [Python + SGX] (*)
-**	Using ARM TrustZone to Build a Trusted Language Runtime for Mobile Applications [.NET + SGX] (*)
+**	[https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/2541940.2541949 Using ARM TrustZone to Build a Trusted Language Runtime for Mobile Applications] [.NET + SGX] (*)
 * Side-channel attacks
-**	Systematic Classification of Side-Channel Attacks: A Case Study for Mobile Devices
+**	[https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8141882 Systematic Classification of Side-Channel Attacks: A Case Study for Mobile Devices]
-**	Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution (*)
+**	[https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/bulck Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution] (*)
-**	Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space (*)
+**	[https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/lipp Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space] (*)
-**	Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution (*)
+**	[https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8835233 Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution] (*)
-**	Latest: Downfall: Exploiting Speculative Data Gathering (*)
+**	Latest: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity23-moghimi.pdf Downfall: Exploiting Speculative Data Gathering] (*)
 * Internal misbehavior: memory attacks
-**	SoK: Eternal War in Memory (*)
+**	[https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6547101 SoK: Eternal War in Memory] (*)
-**	Memory Errors: The Past, the Present, and the Future
+**	[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-33338-5_5 Memory Errors: The Past, the Present, and the Future]
-**	Defense: C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (*)
+**	Defense: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/2976749.2978358 C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software] (*)
-**	Defense: PTAuth: Temporal Memory Safety via Robust Points-to Authentication (*)
+**	Defense: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21summer_mirzazade.pdf PTAuth: Temporal Memory Safety via Robust Points-to Authentication] (*)
-**	Attacking the defense: PACMAN: Attacking ARM Pointer Authentication with Speculative Execution (*)
+**	Attacking the defense: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3470496.3527429 PACMAN: Attacking ARM Pointer Authentication with Speculative Execution] (*)
 * Human authenticating machine
-**	Turtles All The Way Down: Research Challenges in User-Based Attestation
+**	[https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/hotsec07/tech/full_papers/mccune/mccune.pdf Turtles All The Way Down: Research Challenges in User-Based Attestation]
-**	Stark: Tamperproof Authentication to Resist Keylogging (*)
+**	[https://fc13.ifca.ai/proc/9-1.pdf Stark: Tamperproof Authentication to Resist Keylogging] (*)
-**	Evil maid goes after PGP whole disk encryption
+**	[https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1854103 Evil maid goes after PGP whole disk encryption]
-**	PRISM/ Human-Verifiable Code Execution (*)
+**	[https://netsec.ethz.ch/publications/papers/PRISM-2007.pdf PRISM/ Human-Verifiable Code Execution] (*)
 * State continuity
-**	Memoir: Practical state continuity for protected modules (*)
+**	[https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/memoir-practical-state-continuity-for-protected-modules/ Memoir: Practical state continuity for protected modules] (*)
-**	ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution (*)
+**	[https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-matetic.pdf ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution] (*)
-**	Ariadne: A Minimal Approach to State Continuity (*)
+**	[https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_paper_strackx.pdf Ariadne: A Minimal Approach to State Continuity] (*)
 * Secure input/output
-**	SeCloak: ARM TrustZone-based Mobile Peripheral Control
+**	[https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3210240.3210334 SeCloak: ARM TrustZone-based Mobile Peripheral Control]
-**	Building trusted path on untrusted device drivers for mobile devices (*)
+**	[https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2637225 Building trusted path on untrusted device drivers for mobile devices] (*)
-**	TruZ-Droid: Integrating TrustZone with Mobile Operating System (*)
+**	[https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3210338 TruZ-Droid: Integrating TrustZone with Mobile Operating System] (*)
-**	Establishing Trusted I/O Paths for SGX Client Systems with Aurora (*)
+**	[https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8859293 Establishing Trusted I/O Paths for SGX Client Systems with Aurora] (*)
-**	VButton: Practical Attestation of User-driven Operations in Mobile Apps (*)
+**	[https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3210240.3210330 VButton: Practical Attestation of User-driven Operations in Mobile Apps] (*)
-**	ProtectIOn: Root-of-Trust for IO in Compromised Platforms (*)
+**	[https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/protection-root-of-trust-for-io-in-compromised-platforms/ ProtectIOn: Root-of-Trust for IO in Compromised Platforms] (*)
-**	Fidelius: Protecting User Secrets from Compromised Browsers (*)
+**	[https://ieeexplore-ieee-org.ezproxy.u-pec.fr/iel7/8826229/8835208/08835331.pdf Fidelius: Protecting User Secrets from Compromised Browsers] (*)
 * Proposed hardware improvements
-**	Fine-grained isolation: IMIX: In-Process Memory Isolation EXtension (*)
+**	Fine-grained isolation: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity18/sec18-frassetto.pdf IMIX: In-Process Memory Isolation EXtension] (*)
-**	Memory safety: HAFIX: Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity Extension (*)
+**	Memory safety: [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7167258 HAFIX: Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity Extension] (*)
-**	Integrity monitoring: Co-processor-based Behavior Monitoring: Application to the Detection of Attacks Against the System Management Mode (*)
+**	Integrity monitoring: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3134600.3134622 Co-processor-based Behavior Monitoring: Application to the Detection of Attacks Against the System Management Mode] (*)
-**	Integrity monitoring: CPU Transparent Protection of OS Kernel and Hypervisor Integrity with Programmable DRAM (*)
+**	Integrity monitoring: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/2508148.2485956 CPU Transparent Protection of OS Kernel and Hypervisor Integrity with Programmable DRAM] (*)
 * Proposals based on existing (non-security) hardware support
-**	PixelVault: Using GPUs for Securing Cryptographic Operations (*)
+**	[https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2660316&dl=ACM&coll=DL PixelVault: Using GPUs for Securing Cryptographic Operations] (*)
-**	Graviton: Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs (*)
+**	[https://www.usenix.org/system/files/osdi18-volos.pdf Graviton: Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs] (*)
-**	GRIFFIN: Guarding Control Flows Using Intel Processor Trace (*)
+**	[https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3093337.3037716 GRIFFIN: Guarding Control Flows Using Intel Processor Trace] (*)
-**	T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (*)
+**	[https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ndss2017_07-2_Shih_paper.pdf T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs] (*)