SystemsSec 2018W Lecture 7: Difference between revisions

From Soma-notes
Created page with "==Audio== [http://homeostasis.scs.carleton.ca/~soma/systemssec-2018w/lectures/comp4108-2018w-lec07-29Jan2018.m4a Lecture 7 Audio] ==Notes=="
 
Calvin (talk | contribs)
Line 4: Line 4:


==Notes==
==Notes==
- You want cryptography whenever your rival can mess with bits.
i.e see, modify, etc.
- If you're talking about an isolated device, i.e single terminal for one person.
what does crypto do for you? almost nothing. (ex: what if someone steals the system? if they mess with hardware?)
- TLS, SSH most common protocols nowadays for detection.
- #1 Rule: Never do your own crypto, including implementation.
- Most common use case on an individual system: file/file-systems encryption
- You can encrypt a file and send it, but if you have to send it, someone has to do something on the reciever side to decrypt it.
Trusted Software (DRM): DRM: Digital Rights Management
- Almsot no scope for confidentiality, meant mostly for preventing messing with bits.
- Trusted Boot:
- TPM: Trusted Platform Model, this is the portion of a chip that is meant to hold secrets and can do computations without giving away info.
As long as TPM is safe, all data is safe.
- An attacker must do 1 of 3 things if they want data access: break TPM, break the crypto, or get the keys.
- Arguably, getting the keys might be the easiest, even for a company like Apple or Microsoft (Trick one of the human(s) with the keys).
- MalwareBytes: 2 bad updates, essentially acting as a dedicated denial of service. This is a breach of trust.
- How did MS sign my boot order even though I have linux? Because they're allowed to.
- The reason you can't have linux on an Apple device is because of trusted boot;
to startup linux, you would have to break the boot order, which would trigger security precautions.
But, get the keys, and you could probably do it.

Revision as of 05:52, 31 January 2018

Audio

Lecture 7 Audio

Notes

- You want cryptography whenever your rival can mess with bits. i.e see, modify, etc. - If you're talking about an isolated device, i.e single terminal for one person. what does crypto do for you? almost nothing. (ex: what if someone steals the system? if they mess with hardware?)

- TLS, SSH most common protocols nowadays for detection. - #1 Rule: Never do your own crypto, including implementation. - Most common use case on an individual system: file/file-systems encryption - You can encrypt a file and send it, but if you have to send it, someone has to do something on the reciever side to decrypt it.


Trusted Software (DRM): DRM: Digital Rights Management

- Almsot no scope for confidentiality, meant mostly for preventing messing with bits. - Trusted Boot: - TPM: Trusted Platform Model, this is the portion of a chip that is meant to hold secrets and can do computations without giving away info. As long as TPM is safe, all data is safe. - An attacker must do 1 of 3 things if they want data access: break TPM, break the crypto, or get the keys. - Arguably, getting the keys might be the easiest, even for a company like Apple or Microsoft (Trick one of the human(s) with the keys). - MalwareBytes: 2 bad updates, essentially acting as a dedicated denial of service. This is a breach of trust.

- How did MS sign my boot order even though I have linux? Because they're allowed to. - The reason you can't have linux on an Apple device is because of trusted boot; to startup linux, you would have to break the boot order, which would trigger security precautions. But, get the keys, and you could probably do it.