Operating Systems 2015F Lecture 21: Difference between revisions
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| ==Video== | |||
| The video for the lecture given on November 25, 2015 [http://homeostasis.scs.carleton.ca/~soma/os-2015f/lectures/comp3000-2015f-lec21-25Nov2015.mp4 is now available]. | |||
| ==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
| *  | <pre> | ||
| Lecture 21 | |||
| ---------- | |||
| no last assignment | |||
| What is research? | |||
|  * Asking questions and figuring out the answers | |||
|  * Questions are much more important than answers | |||
|  * Questions are much *harder* than answers | |||
| What question you ask determines what answer you'll get | |||
| The research literature | |||
|  - many many publications | |||
|  - hard to tell what is any good | |||
| Reseachers know who to trust in their area, and, how in general to determine trust | |||
|  - do spot checks for obvious errors, based on what you do know | |||
|  - do they give full details about what they did? could you reproduce it? | |||
|  - surprising results require extraordinary evidence | |||
| If you're outside the field, look at | |||
|  - publication reputation | |||
|  - citation counts and quality | |||
| to learn more about operating systems research... | |||
| what are the well-respected venues? | |||
| Conferences, not journals | |||
|  USENIX OSDI | |||
|  ACM SOSP | |||
| When should you *really* look at the research literature? | |||
| You're trying to solve a hard problem and aren't sure what approach to take. | |||
|  * look to see what other people have done in response to similar problems! | |||
| What about computer security? | |||
|  * even more publications | |||
| But there's a truth to research... | |||
|  - most of it isn't any good | |||
| Why? | |||
|  - a lot of research doesn't work in practice | |||
|  - a lot of conclusions are premature | |||
| Computer security research is mostly bad | |||
| Cryptography is mostly bad.  And dangerous. | |||
| * easy to implement | |||
| * hard to implement well | |||
| If you make a mistake, your crypto is worse than useless | |||
| * security cannot be specified or completely defined | |||
| * attacks exploit details that you didn't think about | |||
| Timing attacks | |||
| Game in encryption: encrypt and decrypt without disclosing the plaintext or the key | |||
| For many encryption algorithms, execution time is a function of the plaintext and/or key | |||
| Watch how long a computer takes to encrypt something, and you can figure out the key | |||
| 1970's, Data Encryption Standard (DES) | |||
|  - first developed by IBM | |||
|  - "fixed" by the NSA | |||
|    - halved the key (much easier to break) | |||
|    - fiddled with the constants in the algorithm | |||
| Any security technology may improve and reduce your security at the same time | |||
| security is confidentiality, availability, and integrity | |||
| Example: encrypting a hard disk | |||
| Why not use biometrics | |||
|  - fingerprints | |||
|  - facial recognition | |||
| It is all about your threat model | |||
|  - any technology helps with certain risks and harms versus others | |||
|  - what do you care about? | |||
| Tradeoffs are inherent to technology | |||
| </pre> | |||
Latest revision as of 21:31, 25 November 2015
Video
The video for the lecture given on November 25, 2015 is now available.
Notes
Lecture 21 ---------- no last assignment What is research? * Asking questions and figuring out the answers * Questions are much more important than answers * Questions are much *harder* than answers What question you ask determines what answer you'll get The research literature - many many publications - hard to tell what is any good Reseachers know who to trust in their area, and, how in general to determine trust - do spot checks for obvious errors, based on what you do know - do they give full details about what they did? could you reproduce it? - surprising results require extraordinary evidence If you're outside the field, look at - publication reputation - citation counts and quality to learn more about operating systems research... what are the well-respected venues? Conferences, not journals USENIX OSDI ACM SOSP When should you *really* look at the research literature? You're trying to solve a hard problem and aren't sure what approach to take. * look to see what other people have done in response to similar problems! What about computer security? * even more publications But there's a truth to research... - most of it isn't any good Why? - a lot of research doesn't work in practice - a lot of conclusions are premature Computer security research is mostly bad Cryptography is mostly bad. And dangerous. * easy to implement * hard to implement well If you make a mistake, your crypto is worse than useless * security cannot be specified or completely defined * attacks exploit details that you didn't think about Timing attacks Game in encryption: encrypt and decrypt without disclosing the plaintext or the key For many encryption algorithms, execution time is a function of the plaintext and/or key Watch how long a computer takes to encrypt something, and you can figure out the key 1970's, Data Encryption Standard (DES) - first developed by IBM - "fixed" by the NSA - halved the key (much easier to break) - fiddled with the constants in the algorithm Any security technology may improve and reduce your security at the same time security is confidentiality, availability, and integrity Example: encrypting a hard disk Why not use biometrics - fingerprints - facial recognition It is all about your threat model - any technology helps with certain risks and harms versus others - what do you care about? Tradeoffs are inherent to technology