COMP5900 COMP4900 2024F: Reading list - Revision history

Lianyingzhao at 00:40, 8 October 2024

2024-10-08T00:40:13Z

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	** Defense: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21summer_mirzazade.pdf PTAuth: Temporal Memory Safety via Robust Points-to Authentication] (*)		** Defense: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21summer_mirzazade.pdf PTAuth: Temporal Memory Safety via Robust Points-to Authentication] (*)
	** Attacking the defense: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3470496.3527429 PACMAN: Attacking ARM Pointer Authentication with Speculative Execution] (*)		** Attacking the defense: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3470496.3527429 PACMAN: Attacking ARM Pointer Authentication with Speculative Execution] (*)
			** Attacking the defense: [https://arxiv.org/pdf/2406.08719 TIKTAG: Breaking ARM’s Memory Tagging Extension with Speculative Execution] (*)
	* Human authenticating machine		* Human authenticating machine
	** [https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/hotsec07/tech/full_papers/mccune/mccune.pdf Turtles All The Way Down: Research Challenges in User-Based Attestation]		** [https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/hotsec07/tech/full_papers/mccune/mccune.pdf Turtles All The Way Down: Research Challenges in User-Based Attestation]

Lianyingzhao at 00:56, 18 September 2024

2024-09-18T00:56:22Z

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	** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1352625 Flicker: An Execution Infrastructure for TCB Minimization] (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1352625 Flicker: An Execution Infrastructure for TCB Minimization] (*)
	** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/atc17/atc17-lind.pdf Glamdring: Automatic Application Partitioning for Intel SGX] (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/atc17/atc17-lind.pdf Glamdring: Automatic Application Partitioning for Intel SGX] (*)
			** [https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc17/technical-sessions/presentation/tsai Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX] (*) <span style="color:#0000ff;font-weight:bold"> Recommended </span>
	** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3373376.3378469 Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX] (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3373376.3378469 Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX] (*)
	** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20spring_tsai_prepub.pdf Civet: An Efficient Java Partitioning Framework for Hardware Enclaves] (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20spring_tsai_prepub.pdf Civet: An Efficient Java Partitioning Framework for Hardware Enclaves] (*)

Lianyingzhao at 00:45, 18 September 2024

2024-09-18T00:45:11Z

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	** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3186101 SafeKeeper: Protecting Web Passwords using Trusted Execution Environments]		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3186101 SafeKeeper: Protecting Web Passwords using Trusted Execution Environments]
	* Application of TC technologies		* Application of TC technologies
	** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi16/osdi16-arnautov.pdf SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX] (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi16/osdi16-arnautov.pdf SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX] (*) <span style="color:#0000ff;font-weight:bold"> Recommended </span>
	** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8464097 SGX-Tor: A Secure and Practical Tor Anonymity Network with SGX Enclaves] (*)		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8464097 SGX-Tor: A Secure and Practical Tor Anonymity Network with SGX Enclaves] (*)
	** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8418608 EnclaveDB: A Secure Database using SGX] (*)		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8418608 EnclaveDB: A Secure Database using SGX] (*)

Lianyingzhao at 15:42, 8 September 2024

2024-09-08T15:42:54Z

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	If you are looking for more papers (from which you consider choosing to present):		If you are looking for more papers (from which you consider choosing to present):

	[https://github.com/vschiavoni/sgx-papers Papers about/using Intel SGX]		[https://github.com/vschiavoni/sgx-papers Papers about/using Intel SGX]

	You can also check out these [https://github.com/Maxul/Awesome-SGX-Open-Source SGX Open Source Projects] (with or without papers).		You can also check out these [https://github.com/Maxul/Awesome-SGX-Open-Source SGX Open Source Projects] (with or without papers).

Lianyingzhao at 15:42, 8 September 2024

2024-09-08T15:42:38Z

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	You can only sign up for papers with an asterisk (*) at the end of their title.		You can only sign up for papers with an asterisk (*) at the end of their title.

			If you are looking for more papers (from which you consider choosing to present):
			[https://github.com/vschiavoni/sgx-papers Papers about/using Intel SGX]
			You can also check out these [https://github.com/Maxul/Awesome-SGX-Open-Source SGX Open Source Projects] (with or without papers).

	* Introduction to the course and trusted computing		* Introduction to the course and trusted computing

Lianyingzhao at 02:25, 4 September 2024

2024-09-04T02:25:09Z

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	** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7807249 Hardware-Based Trusted Computing Architectures for Isolation and Attestation]		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7807249 Hardware-Based Trusted Computing Architectures for Isolation and Attestation]
	** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7345265 Trusted Execution Environment: What It is, and What It is Not]		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7345265 Trusted Execution Environment: What It is, and What It is Not]
			** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3672392 A Survey of Hardware Improvements to Secure Program Execution]
	* Trust		* Trust
	** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1849988 Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers]		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1849988 Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers]

Lianyingzhao at 04:37, 29 August 2024

2024-08-29T04:37:52Z

Lianyingzhao at 04:19, 29 August 2024

2024-08-29T04:19:32Z

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	** Data protection: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3190508.3190518 Pesos: Policy Enhanced Secure Object Store] (*)		** Data protection: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3190508.3190518 Pesos: Policy Enhanced Secure Object Store] (*)
	* Making TC technologies more adoptable/usable		* Making TC technologies more adoptable/usable
	** Flicker: An Execution Infrastructure for TCB Minimization (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1352625 Flicker: An Execution Infrastructure for TCB Minimization] (*)
	** Glamdring: Automatic Application Partitioning for Intel SGX (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/atc17/atc17-lind.pdf Glamdring: Automatic Application Partitioning for Intel SGX] (*)
	** Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3373376.3378469 Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX] (*)
	** Civet: An Efficient Java Partitioning Framework for Hardware Enclaves (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20spring_tsai_prepub.pdf Civet: An Efficient Java Partitioning Framework for Hardware Enclaves] (*)
	** vTZ: Virtualizing ARM TrustZone (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-hua.pdf vTZ: Virtualizing ARM TrustZone] (*)
	** Towards Memory Safe Enclave Programming with Rust-SGX [Rust + SGX] (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3319535.3354241 Towards Memory Safe Enclave Programming with Rust-SGX] [Rust + SGX] (*)
	** RusTEE: Developing Memory-Safe ARM TrustZone Applications [Rust + ARM] (*)		** RusTEE: Developing Memory-Safe ARM TrustZone Applications [Rust + ARM] (*)
	** SGXPy: Protecting integrity of Python applications with Intel SGX [Python + SGX] (*)		** SGXPy: Protecting integrity of Python applications with Intel SGX [Python + SGX] (*)

Lianyingzhao at 04:11, 29 August 2024

2024-08-29T04:11:52Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:11, 29 August 2024
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	** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3186101 SafeKeeper: Protecting Web Passwords using Trusted Execution Environments]		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3186101 SafeKeeper: Protecting Web Passwords using Trusted Execution Environments]
	* Application of TC technologies		* Application of TC technologies
	** SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi16/osdi16-arnautov.pdf SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX] (*)
	** SGX-Tor: A Secure and Practical Tor Anonymity Network with SGX Enclaves (*)		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8464097 SGX-Tor: A Secure and Practical Tor Anonymity Network with SGX Enclaves] (*)
	** EnclaveDB: A Secure Database using SGX (*)		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8418608 EnclaveDB: A Secure Database using SGX] (*)
	** SGX-Log: Securing System Logs with SGX (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3052973.3053034 SGX-Log: Securing System Logs with SGX] (*)
	** OS integrity: Nighthawk: Transparent System Introspection from Ring -3 (*)		** OS integrity: [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-29962-0_11 Nighthawk: Transparent System Introspection from Ring -3] (*)
	** Hypervisor integrity: HyperCheck: A Hardware-Assisted Integrity Monitor (*)		** Hypervisor integrity: [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6682894 HyperCheck: A Hardware-Assisted Integrity Monitor] (*)
	** Data protection: Pesos: Policy Enhanced Secure Object Store (*)		** Data protection: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3190508.3190518 Pesos: Policy Enhanced Secure Object Store] (*)
	* Making TC technologies more adoptable/usable		* Making TC technologies more adoptable/usable
	** Flicker: An Execution Infrastructure for TCB Minimization (*)		** Flicker: An Execution Infrastructure for TCB Minimization (*)

Lianyingzhao at 23:09, 28 August 2024

2024-08-28T23:09:51Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:09, 28 August 2024
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	* Introduction to the course and trusted computing		* Introduction to the course and trusted computing
	** [https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/files/1873/RR-08-11.PDF The ten-page introduction to Trusted Computing]		** [https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/files/1873/RR-08-11.PDF The ten-page introduction to Trusted Computing]
	** Hardware-Based Trusted Computing Architectures for Isolation and Attestation		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7807249 Hardware-Based Trusted Computing Architectures for Isolation and Attestation]
	** Trusted Execution Environment: What It is, and What It is Not		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7345265 Trusted Execution Environment: What It is, and What It is Not]
	* Trust		* Trust
	** Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1849988 Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers]
	** Reflections on Trusting Trust (Turing Award lecture, 1984)		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=358210 Reflections on Trusting Trust] (Turing Award lecture, 1984)
	** SafeKeeper: Protecting Web Passwords using Trusted Execution Environments		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3186101 SafeKeeper: Protecting Web Passwords using Trusted Execution Environments]
	* Application of TC technologies		* Application of TC technologies
	** SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX (*)		** SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX (*)

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:37, 29 August 2024
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	** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-hua.pdf vTZ: Virtualizing ARM TrustZone] (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-hua.pdf vTZ: Virtualizing ARM TrustZone] (*)
	** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3319535.3354241 Towards Memory Safe Enclave Programming with Rust-SGX] [Rust + SGX] (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3319535.3354241 Towards Memory Safe Enclave Programming with Rust-SGX] [Rust + SGX] (*)
	** RusTEE: Developing Memory-Safe ARM TrustZone Applications [Rust + ARM] (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3427228.3427262 RusTEE: Developing Memory-Safe ARM TrustZone Applications] [Rust + ARM] (*)
	** SGXPy: Protecting integrity of Python applications with Intel SGX [Python + SGX] (*)		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8945648 SGXPy: Protecting integrity of Python applications with Intel SGX] [Python + SGX] (*)
	** Using ARM TrustZone to Build a Trusted Language Runtime for Mobile Applications [.NET + SGX] (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/2541940.2541949 Using ARM TrustZone to Build a Trusted Language Runtime for Mobile Applications] [.NET + SGX] (*)
	* Side-channel attacks		* Side-channel attacks
	** Systematic Classification of Side-Channel Attacks: A Case Study for Mobile Devices		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8141882 Systematic Classification of Side-Channel Attacks: A Case Study for Mobile Devices]
	** Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/bulck Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution] (*)
	** Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/lipp Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space] (*)
	** Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution (*)		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8835233 Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution] (*)
	** Latest: Downfall: Exploiting Speculative Data Gathering (*)		** Latest: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity23-moghimi.pdf Downfall: Exploiting Speculative Data Gathering] (*)
	* Internal misbehavior: memory attacks		* Internal misbehavior: memory attacks
	** SoK: Eternal War in Memory (*)		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6547101 SoK: Eternal War in Memory] (*)
	** Memory Errors: The Past, the Present, and the Future		** [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-33338-5_5 Memory Errors: The Past, the Present, and the Future]
	** Defense: C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (*)		** Defense: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/2976749.2978358 C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software] (*)
	** Defense: PTAuth: Temporal Memory Safety via Robust Points-to Authentication (*)		** Defense: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21summer_mirzazade.pdf PTAuth: Temporal Memory Safety via Robust Points-to Authentication] (*)
	** Attacking the defense: PACMAN: Attacking ARM Pointer Authentication with Speculative Execution (*)		** Attacking the defense: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3470496.3527429 PACMAN: Attacking ARM Pointer Authentication with Speculative Execution] (*)
	* Human authenticating machine		* Human authenticating machine
	** Turtles All The Way Down: Research Challenges in User-Based Attestation		** [https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/hotsec07/tech/full_papers/mccune/mccune.pdf Turtles All The Way Down: Research Challenges in User-Based Attestation]
	** Stark: Tamperproof Authentication to Resist Keylogging (*)		** [https://fc13.ifca.ai/proc/9-1.pdf Stark: Tamperproof Authentication to Resist Keylogging] (*)
	** Evil maid goes after PGP whole disk encryption		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1854103 Evil maid goes after PGP whole disk encryption]
	** PRISM/ Human-Verifiable Code Execution (*)		** [https://netsec.ethz.ch/publications/papers/PRISM-2007.pdf PRISM/ Human-Verifiable Code Execution] (*)
	* State continuity		* State continuity
	** Memoir: Practical state continuity for protected modules (*)		** [https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/memoir-practical-state-continuity-for-protected-modules/ Memoir: Practical state continuity for protected modules] (*)
	** ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-matetic.pdf ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution] (*)
	** Ariadne: A Minimal Approach to State Continuity (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_paper_strackx.pdf Ariadne: A Minimal Approach to State Continuity] (*)
	* Secure input/output		* Secure input/output
	** SeCloak: ARM TrustZone-based Mobile Peripheral Control		** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3210240.3210334 SeCloak: ARM TrustZone-based Mobile Peripheral Control]
	** Building trusted path on untrusted device drivers for mobile devices (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2637225 Building trusted path on untrusted device drivers for mobile devices] (*)
	** TruZ-Droid: Integrating TrustZone with Mobile Operating System (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3210338 TruZ-Droid: Integrating TrustZone with Mobile Operating System] (*)
	** Establishing Trusted I/O Paths for SGX Client Systems with Aurora (*)		** [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8859293 Establishing Trusted I/O Paths for SGX Client Systems with Aurora] (*)
	** VButton: Practical Attestation of User-driven Operations in Mobile Apps (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3210240.3210330 VButton: Practical Attestation of User-driven Operations in Mobile Apps] (*)
	** ProtectIOn: Root-of-Trust for IO in Compromised Platforms (*)		** [https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/protection-root-of-trust-for-io-in-compromised-platforms/ ProtectIOn: Root-of-Trust for IO in Compromised Platforms] (*)
	** Fidelius: Protecting User Secrets from Compromised Browsers (*)		** [https://ieeexplore-ieee-org.ezproxy.u-pec.fr/iel7/8826229/8835208/08835331.pdf Fidelius: Protecting User Secrets from Compromised Browsers] (*)
	* Proposed hardware improvements		* Proposed hardware improvements
	** Fine-grained isolation: IMIX: In-Process Memory Isolation EXtension (*)		** Fine-grained isolation: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity18/sec18-frassetto.pdf IMIX: In-Process Memory Isolation EXtension] (*)
	** Memory safety: HAFIX: Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity Extension (*)		** Memory safety: [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7167258 HAFIX: Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity Extension] (*)
	** Integrity monitoring: Co-processor-based Behavior Monitoring: Application to the Detection of Attacks Against the System Management Mode (*)		** Integrity monitoring: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3134600.3134622 Co-processor-based Behavior Monitoring: Application to the Detection of Attacks Against the System Management Mode] (*)
	** Integrity monitoring: CPU Transparent Protection of OS Kernel and Hypervisor Integrity with Programmable DRAM (*)		** Integrity monitoring: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/2508148.2485956 CPU Transparent Protection of OS Kernel and Hypervisor Integrity with Programmable DRAM] (*)
	* Proposals based on existing (non-security) hardware support		* Proposals based on existing (non-security) hardware support
	** PixelVault: Using GPUs for Securing Cryptographic Operations (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2660316&dl=ACM&coll=DL PixelVault: Using GPUs for Securing Cryptographic Operations] (*)
	** Graviton: Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs (*)		** [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/osdi18-volos.pdf Graviton: Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs] (*)
	** GRIFFIN: Guarding Control Flows Using Intel Processor Trace (*)		** [https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3093337.3037716 GRIFFIN: Guarding Control Flows Using Intel Processor Trace] (*)
	** T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (*)		** [https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ndss2017_07-2_Shih_paper.pdf T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs] (*)