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	<updated>2026-05-02T07:45:18Z</updated>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://homeostasis.scs.carleton.ca/wiki/index.php?title=SystemsSec_2016W_Lecture_19&amp;diff=20931</id>
		<title>SystemsSec 2016W Lecture 19</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://homeostasis.scs.carleton.ca/wiki/index.php?title=SystemsSec_2016W_Lecture_19&amp;diff=20931"/>
		<updated>2016-04-06T18:55:17Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Gilbertls: /* Reading: Thermal Covert Channels */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;===Data Compression===&lt;br /&gt;
  • Compression and encryption can mess with each other&lt;br /&gt;
  • People can reconstruct VoIP depending on how it was compressed&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Reading: Data Compression In Network Services===&lt;br /&gt;
  • Our paper was talking about “zip bombs” and they are everywhere&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Compressed archive is trivial to send to a server, but it is computationally demanding on the receiving server to process&lt;br /&gt;
      o	The decompression ties up resources&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Can be used against an anti-virus, scan a zip file which decompresses and fills up memory so much it crashes&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Attack uses lots of spaces, repeat the same data over and over&lt;br /&gt;
      o	How do you make a zip bomb, without blowing yourself up? &lt;br /&gt;
        -  Hand craft it or you only have to do it once and can then send it multiple times (do hard work once VS server must do it multiple times).&lt;br /&gt;
  • Did they report every piece of software they tested?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	They did web, chat, and email (IMAP), but not SMTP...? &lt;br /&gt;
      o	Probably because the results of SMTP wouldn&#039;t be interesting. &lt;br /&gt;
        -  SMTP have spam filters and AV, so they could be vulnerable. &lt;br /&gt;
        -  But email has been under attack for so long that email servers have been hardened over the years because of constant attacks.&lt;br /&gt;
  • DOS hasn&#039;t been used on the web as much because it is usually easy to counter thanks to the service providers.&lt;br /&gt;
  • Wasn&#039;t crazy scientific did not quantify the issue and the potential damage that could be done.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Instead just affirmed there was an issue.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Paper was published because the issue was not well recognised. Was published last August... &lt;br /&gt;
  • Denial of Service&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Web servers&lt;br /&gt;
        -  Web servers are under attack all the time. There are many resources and tools on how to mitigate DOS attacks against a web server.&lt;br /&gt;
        -  How do you stop your web server from dying when web traffic gets a spike?&lt;br /&gt;
            • Use a content distribution network to mirror your content. Good for static content. Works okay for dynamic content.&lt;br /&gt;
            • If you are offering a service you have to build it to scale properly so it can run new instances to deal with the load.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Chat server&lt;br /&gt;
        -  Chat server goes down. You can just use another one.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	IMAP (private email server)&lt;br /&gt;
        -  IMAP is attacked. You can&#039;t access email on that specific email client.&lt;br /&gt;
  • Compression is just one way to do DOS, there are many more.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Amplification attacks: Send packet to a public server that then sends multiple to a specific target.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Create Multiple Connection: In a SYN flood attack we send SYN packets to a TCP server to tie up resources by creating excessive connections.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	etc...&lt;br /&gt;
  • This paper is really about resource management.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Right way to defend against this is to limit resources appropriately.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Reading: Thermal Covert Channels===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  • Not about attacking a system, but about exfiltrating data&lt;br /&gt;
      o	IP over thermometers&lt;br /&gt;
  • Covert Channel: data stream that people do not know about&lt;br /&gt;
  • Why do we worry about these? &lt;br /&gt;
      o	Data is either escaping or entering without our knowing.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Covert channels that people care about are usually ones that go through something that shouldn&#039;t be possible or channels that have high bandwidth.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	How big is it? How much data can you pass through it?&lt;br /&gt;
        -  ~12 bits per second&lt;br /&gt;
  • Why is this paper interesting?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	The cloud&lt;br /&gt;
      o	If processes share the same core, it is possible to get information from another process just from sharing that core&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Temperature patterns can leak hash data&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Get secret key from another machine through the temperature of a shared core&lt;br /&gt;
      o	To keep secrecy put each machine on its own core&lt;br /&gt;
  • How usable is this threat?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	~12 bits per second&lt;br /&gt;
      o	In the cloud, if it is CPU intensive than it is hard to use, however the machines don&#039;t usually do CPU intensive tasks all the time&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Is a real covert channel, but not very useful right now for an attack&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Very hard to get a secret key using this&lt;br /&gt;
      o	In the future with higher resolution thermal sensors, the attack may be much more practical&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Most people should not worry about this sort of attack. There are so many other ways that an attacker can compromise you.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===IPhone case===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  • The FBI dropped the case, the excuse they gave was that they did not need their help and had another way to do it&lt;br /&gt;
  • A lot of people were against Apple in the polls.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	A large amount of the population do not know the importance of encryption&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Do not understand that a backdoor can both be abused by the government and other attackers&lt;br /&gt;
  • In Paris attacks there was no encryption used, they used burner phones instead&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Gilbertls</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://homeostasis.scs.carleton.ca/wiki/index.php?title=SystemsSec_2016W_Lecture_19&amp;diff=20930</id>
		<title>SystemsSec 2016W Lecture 19</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://homeostasis.scs.carleton.ca/wiki/index.php?title=SystemsSec_2016W_Lecture_19&amp;diff=20930"/>
		<updated>2016-04-06T18:55:00Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Gilbertls: /* Thermal Covert Channels */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;===Data Compression===&lt;br /&gt;
  • Compression and encryption can mess with each other&lt;br /&gt;
  • People can reconstruct VoIP depending on how it was compressed&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Reading: Data Compression In Network Services===&lt;br /&gt;
  • Our paper was talking about “zip bombs” and they are everywhere&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Compressed archive is trivial to send to a server, but it is computationally demanding on the receiving server to process&lt;br /&gt;
      o	The decompression ties up resources&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Can be used against an anti-virus, scan a zip file which decompresses and fills up memory so much it crashes&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Attack uses lots of spaces, repeat the same data over and over&lt;br /&gt;
      o	How do you make a zip bomb, without blowing yourself up? &lt;br /&gt;
        -  Hand craft it or you only have to do it once and can then send it multiple times (do hard work once VS server must do it multiple times).&lt;br /&gt;
  • Did they report every piece of software they tested?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	They did web, chat, and email (IMAP), but not SMTP...? &lt;br /&gt;
      o	Probably because the results of SMTP wouldn&#039;t be interesting. &lt;br /&gt;
        -  SMTP have spam filters and AV, so they could be vulnerable. &lt;br /&gt;
        -  But email has been under attack for so long that email servers have been hardened over the years because of constant attacks.&lt;br /&gt;
  • DOS hasn&#039;t been used on the web as much because it is usually easy to counter thanks to the service providers.&lt;br /&gt;
  • Wasn&#039;t crazy scientific did not quantify the issue and the potential damage that could be done.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Instead just affirmed there was an issue.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Paper was published because the issue was not well recognised. Was published last August... &lt;br /&gt;
  • Denial of Service&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Web servers&lt;br /&gt;
        -  Web servers are under attack all the time. There are many resources and tools on how to mitigate DOS attacks against a web server.&lt;br /&gt;
        -  How do you stop your web server from dying when web traffic gets a spike?&lt;br /&gt;
            • Use a content distribution network to mirror your content. Good for static content. Works okay for dynamic content.&lt;br /&gt;
            • If you are offering a service you have to build it to scale properly so it can run new instances to deal with the load.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Chat server&lt;br /&gt;
        -  Chat server goes down. You can just use another one.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	IMAP (private email server)&lt;br /&gt;
        -  IMAP is attacked. You can&#039;t access email on that specific email client.&lt;br /&gt;
  • Compression is just one way to do DOS, there are many more.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Amplification attacks: Send packet to a public server that then sends multiple to a specific target.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Create Multiple Connection: In a SYN flood attack we send SYN packets to a TCP server to tie up resources by creating excessive connections.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	etc...&lt;br /&gt;
  • This paper is really about resource management.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Right way to defend against this is to limit resources appropriately.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Reading: Thermal Covert Channels===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  • Not about attacking a system, but about exfiltrating data&lt;br /&gt;
      o	IP over thermometers&lt;br /&gt;
  • Covert Channel: data stream that people do not know about&lt;br /&gt;
  • Why do we worry about these? &lt;br /&gt;
      o	Data is either escaping or entering without our knowing.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Covert channels that people care about are usually ones that go through something that shouldn&#039;t be possible or channels that have high bandwidth.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	How big is it? How much data can you pass through it?&lt;br /&gt;
        -  ~12 bits per second&lt;br /&gt;
  • Why is this paper interesting?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	The cloud&lt;br /&gt;
      o	If processes share the same core, it is possible to get information from another process just from sharing that core&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Temperature patterns can leak hash data&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Get secret key from another machine through the temperature of a shared core&lt;br /&gt;
      o	To keep secrecy put each machine on its own core&lt;br /&gt;
  • How usable is this threat?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	~12 bits per second&lt;br /&gt;
      o	In the cloud, if it is CPU intensive than it is hard to use, however the machines don&#039;t usually do CPU intensive tasks all the time&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Is a real covert channel, but not very useful right now for an attack&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Very hard to get a secret key using this&lt;br /&gt;
      o	In the future with higher resolution thermal sensors, the attack may be much more practical&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Most people should not worry about this sort of attack. There are so many other ways that an attacker can compromise you.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;IPhone case&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  • The FBI dropped the case, the excuse they gave was that they did not need their help and had another way to do it&lt;br /&gt;
  • A lot of people were against Apple in the polls.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	A large amount of the population do not know the importance of encryption&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Do not understand that a backdoor can both be abused by the government and other attackers&lt;br /&gt;
  • In Paris attacks there was no encryption used, they used burner phones instead&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Gilbertls</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://homeostasis.scs.carleton.ca/wiki/index.php?title=SystemsSec_2016W_Lecture_19&amp;diff=20929</id>
		<title>SystemsSec 2016W Lecture 19</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://homeostasis.scs.carleton.ca/wiki/index.php?title=SystemsSec_2016W_Lecture_19&amp;diff=20929"/>
		<updated>2016-04-06T18:54:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Gilbertls: /* Data Compression In Network Services */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;===Data Compression===&lt;br /&gt;
  • Compression and encryption can mess with each other&lt;br /&gt;
  • People can reconstruct VoIP depending on how it was compressed&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Reading: Data Compression In Network Services===&lt;br /&gt;
  • Our paper was talking about “zip bombs” and they are everywhere&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Compressed archive is trivial to send to a server, but it is computationally demanding on the receiving server to process&lt;br /&gt;
      o	The decompression ties up resources&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Can be used against an anti-virus, scan a zip file which decompresses and fills up memory so much it crashes&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Attack uses lots of spaces, repeat the same data over and over&lt;br /&gt;
      o	How do you make a zip bomb, without blowing yourself up? &lt;br /&gt;
        -  Hand craft it or you only have to do it once and can then send it multiple times (do hard work once VS server must do it multiple times).&lt;br /&gt;
  • Did they report every piece of software they tested?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	They did web, chat, and email (IMAP), but not SMTP...? &lt;br /&gt;
      o	Probably because the results of SMTP wouldn&#039;t be interesting. &lt;br /&gt;
        -  SMTP have spam filters and AV, so they could be vulnerable. &lt;br /&gt;
        -  But email has been under attack for so long that email servers have been hardened over the years because of constant attacks.&lt;br /&gt;
  • DOS hasn&#039;t been used on the web as much because it is usually easy to counter thanks to the service providers.&lt;br /&gt;
  • Wasn&#039;t crazy scientific did not quantify the issue and the potential damage that could be done.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Instead just affirmed there was an issue.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Paper was published because the issue was not well recognised. Was published last August... &lt;br /&gt;
  • Denial of Service&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Web servers&lt;br /&gt;
        -  Web servers are under attack all the time. There are many resources and tools on how to mitigate DOS attacks against a web server.&lt;br /&gt;
        -  How do you stop your web server from dying when web traffic gets a spike?&lt;br /&gt;
            • Use a content distribution network to mirror your content. Good for static content. Works okay for dynamic content.&lt;br /&gt;
            • If you are offering a service you have to build it to scale properly so it can run new instances to deal with the load.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Chat server&lt;br /&gt;
        -  Chat server goes down. You can just use another one.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	IMAP (private email server)&lt;br /&gt;
        -  IMAP is attacked. You can&#039;t access email on that specific email client.&lt;br /&gt;
  • Compression is just one way to do DOS, there are many more.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Amplification attacks: Send packet to a public server that then sends multiple to a specific target.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Create Multiple Connection: In a SYN flood attack we send SYN packets to a TCP server to tie up resources by creating excessive connections.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	etc...&lt;br /&gt;
  • This paper is really about resource management.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Right way to defend against this is to limit resources appropriately.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Thermal Covert Channels===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  • Not about attacking a system, but about exfiltrating data&lt;br /&gt;
      o	IP over thermometers&lt;br /&gt;
  • Covert Channel: data stream that people do not know about&lt;br /&gt;
  • Why do we worry about these? &lt;br /&gt;
      o	Data is either escaping or entering without our knowing.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Covert channels that people care about are usually ones that go through something that shouldn&#039;t be possible or channels that have high bandwidth.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	How big is it? How much data can you pass through it?&lt;br /&gt;
        -  ~12 bits per second&lt;br /&gt;
  • Why is this paper interesting?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	The cloud&lt;br /&gt;
      o	If processes share the same core, it is possible to get information from another process just from sharing that core&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Temperature patterns can leak hash data&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Get secret key from another machine through the temperature of a shared core&lt;br /&gt;
      o	To keep secrecy put each machine on its own core&lt;br /&gt;
  • How usable is this threat?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	~12 bits per second&lt;br /&gt;
      o	In the cloud, if it is CPU intensive than it is hard to use, however the machines don&#039;t usually do CPU intensive tasks all the time&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Is a real covert channel, but not very useful right now for an attack&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Very hard to get a secret key using this&lt;br /&gt;
      o	In the future with higher resolution thermal sensors, the attack may be much more practical&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Most people should not worry about this sort of attack. There are so many other ways that an attacker can compromise you.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;IPhone case&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  • The FBI dropped the case, the excuse they gave was that they did not need their help and had another way to do it&lt;br /&gt;
  • A lot of people were against Apple in the polls.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	A large amount of the population do not know the importance of encryption&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Do not understand that a backdoor can both be abused by the government and other attackers&lt;br /&gt;
  • In Paris attacks there was no encryption used, they used burner phones instead&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Gilbertls</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://homeostasis.scs.carleton.ca/wiki/index.php?title=SystemsSec_2016W_Lecture_19&amp;diff=20928</id>
		<title>SystemsSec 2016W Lecture 19</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://homeostasis.scs.carleton.ca/wiki/index.php?title=SystemsSec_2016W_Lecture_19&amp;diff=20928"/>
		<updated>2016-04-06T18:54:14Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Gilbertls: Created page with &amp;quot;===Data Compression===   • Compression and encryption can mess with each other   • People can reconstruct VoIP depending on how it was compressed  ===Data Compression In N...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;===Data Compression===&lt;br /&gt;
  • Compression and encryption can mess with each other&lt;br /&gt;
  • People can reconstruct VoIP depending on how it was compressed&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Data Compression In Network Services===&lt;br /&gt;
  • Our paper was talking about “zip bombs” and they are everywhere&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Compressed archive is trivial to send to a server, but it is computationally demanding on the receiving server to process&lt;br /&gt;
      o	The decompression ties up resources&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Can be used against an anti-virus, scan a zip file which decompresses and fills up memory so much it crashes&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Attack uses lots of spaces, repeat the same data over and over&lt;br /&gt;
      o	How do you make a zip bomb, without blowing yourself up? &lt;br /&gt;
        -  Hand craft it or you only have to do it once and can then send it multiple times (do hard work once VS server must do it multiple times).&lt;br /&gt;
  • Did they report every piece of software they tested?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	They did web, chat, and email (IMAP), but not SMTP...? &lt;br /&gt;
      o	Probably because the results of SMTP wouldn&#039;t be interesting. &lt;br /&gt;
        -  SMTP have spam filters and AV, so they could be vulnerable. &lt;br /&gt;
        -  But email has been under attack for so long that email servers have been hardened over the years because of constant attacks.&lt;br /&gt;
  • DOS hasn&#039;t been used on the web as much because it is usually easy to counter thanks to the service providers.&lt;br /&gt;
  • Wasn&#039;t crazy scientific did not quantify the issue and the potential damage that could be done.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Instead just affirmed there was an issue.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Paper was published because the issue was not well recognised. Was published last August... &lt;br /&gt;
  • Denial of Service&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Web servers&lt;br /&gt;
        -  Web servers are under attack all the time. There are many resources and tools on how to mitigate DOS attacks against a web server.&lt;br /&gt;
        -  How do you stop your web server from dying when web traffic gets a spike?&lt;br /&gt;
            • Use a content distribution network to mirror your content. Good for static content. Works okay for dynamic content.&lt;br /&gt;
            • If you are offering a service you have to build it to scale properly so it can run new instances to deal with the load.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Chat server&lt;br /&gt;
        -  Chat server goes down. You can just use another one.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	IMAP (private email server)&lt;br /&gt;
        -  IMAP is attacked. You can&#039;t access email on that specific email client.&lt;br /&gt;
  • Compression is just one way to do DOS, there are many more.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Amplification attacks: Send packet to a public server that then sends multiple to a specific target.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Create Multiple Connection: In a SYN flood attack we send SYN packets to a TCP server to tie up resources by creating excessive connections.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	etc...&lt;br /&gt;
  • This paper is really about resource management.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Right way to defend against this is to limit resources appropriately.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Thermal Covert Channels===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  • Not about attacking a system, but about exfiltrating data&lt;br /&gt;
      o	IP over thermometers&lt;br /&gt;
  • Covert Channel: data stream that people do not know about&lt;br /&gt;
  • Why do we worry about these? &lt;br /&gt;
      o	Data is either escaping or entering without our knowing.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Covert channels that people care about are usually ones that go through something that shouldn&#039;t be possible or channels that have high bandwidth.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	How big is it? How much data can you pass through it?&lt;br /&gt;
        -  ~12 bits per second&lt;br /&gt;
  • Why is this paper interesting?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	The cloud&lt;br /&gt;
      o	If processes share the same core, it is possible to get information from another process just from sharing that core&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Temperature patterns can leak hash data&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Get secret key from another machine through the temperature of a shared core&lt;br /&gt;
      o	To keep secrecy put each machine on its own core&lt;br /&gt;
  • How usable is this threat?&lt;br /&gt;
      o	~12 bits per second&lt;br /&gt;
      o	In the cloud, if it is CPU intensive than it is hard to use, however the machines don&#039;t usually do CPU intensive tasks all the time&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Is a real covert channel, but not very useful right now for an attack&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Very hard to get a secret key using this&lt;br /&gt;
      o	In the future with higher resolution thermal sensors, the attack may be much more practical&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Most people should not worry about this sort of attack. There are so many other ways that an attacker can compromise you.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;IPhone case&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  • The FBI dropped the case, the excuse they gave was that they did not need their help and had another way to do it&lt;br /&gt;
  • A lot of people were against Apple in the polls.&lt;br /&gt;
      o	A large amount of the population do not know the importance of encryption&lt;br /&gt;
      o	Do not understand that a backdoor can both be abused by the government and other attackers&lt;br /&gt;
  • In Paris attacks there was no encryption used, they used burner phones instead&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Gilbertls</name></author>
	</entry>
</feed>